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Abstract
The paper compares emission tax and emission quota in a mixed duopoly when
the partial privatization of a public ¯rm is allowed. Furthermore, we consider the
following two cases with regard to the objective of the public ¯rm: (1) the public
¯rm maximizes the weighted average of its pro¯t and welfare and (2) the public ¯rm
maximizes the weighted average of its pro¯t and the sum of consumer surplus and
producer surplus. We show that emission tax is welfare superior to emission quota
regardless of the degree of partial privatization in (1), whereas the former is inferior
to the latter when the degree of partial privatization is high in (2).
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1 Introduction
Environmental policies in a mixed oligopoly have been analyzed in recent years. With
regard to the previous studies on environmental policy, B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2006),
Beladi and Chao (2006), Wang and Wang (2009), and Wang et al. (2009) investigate
the e®ects of emission tax in a domestic market, while Ohori (2006a, 2006b) considers
the same in an international market. With regard to the earlier comparative works on
environmental policies, Kato (2006) compares tradable emission permits with non-tradable
emission permits, Naito and Ogawa (2009) compare emission standard with emission tax,
and Kato (2010) compares emission taxes and emission quotas. The emergence of these
works is linked to the phenomenon that the concern for environmental problems has been
growing in both the developed and developing countries, where mixed oligopolies are quite
common.1
This paper investigates welfare comparisons between emission tax and emission quota
in a mixed duopoly where the partial privatization of a public ¯rm is allowed. Further, we
consider two cases for the objective of the public ¯rm: (1) the public ¯rm maximizes the
weighted average of its pro¯t and welfare and (2) the public ¯rm maximizes the weighted
average of its pro¯t and the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus (CSPS). In
this paper, we call the public ¯rm in the former case a welfare maximizer and that in the
latter case a CSPS maximizer.
We comment on the two objectives of the public ¯rm. The ¯rst objective has a the-
oretical basis. As is often assumed in previous studies on standard mixed oligopoly, the
objective of the public ¯rm is to maximize social welfare. This setting is also used in
studies on the environmental problems in a mixed oligopoly (B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on
(2006); Cato (2008); and Naito and Ogawa (2009)). In this setting, we can consider the
role of the public ¯rm facing environmental problems in the framework of a standard mixed
oligopoly: does the existence of a welfare-maximizing public ¯rm enhance welfare given
the environmental problem?
1See B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2006) and Ohori (2006a).
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However, there exist some earlier works where the public ¯rm has another objective|
CSPS maximization|such as Beladi and Chao (2006), Ohori (2006b), and Wang and Wang
(2009).2 As is pointed out by Ohori (2006a), several public ¯rms|as they were at that time
in many developing countries|showed poor performance with regard to environmental
quality. Therefore, the second objective of the public ¯rm seems to be quite natural, and
has a practical basis. It might be worthwhile to comparatively analyze welfare under both
objectives of the public ¯rm.
The work most related to this paper is Kato (2010). Kato (2010) examines the e®ects
of emission tax and emission quota in a mixed duopoly and shows that whether or not
emission tax is welfare superior to emission quota is determined by the values of the
parameters of the production and abatement cost functions when the public ¯rm is a pure
welfare maximizer, whereas emission quota is always welfare superior to emission tax when
the public ¯rm is a pure CSPS maximizer. Kato (2010) also shows that when the public
¯rm is a pure welfare maximizer, full privatization yields the lowest welfare regardless of
the cost parameters, whereas it might enhance welfare for some range of the parameters
when the public ¯rm is a pure CSPS maximizer.
However, Kato (2010) does not consider the partial privatization of the public ¯rm. As
Wang et al. (2009) show that partial privatization enhances welfare under emission tax,
there is a possibility that the degree of partial privatization might change the superiority
of these environmental policies. Therefore, this paper examines how the degree of partial
privatization a®ects welfare superiority between emission tax and emission quota. Further,
this paper also investigates how the di®erence in the public ¯rm's objective a®ects the
2With regard to Wang and Wang (2009) and Ohori (2006b), the objective of the public ¯rm (the
framework) is slightly di®erent from ours. In Wang and Wang (2009), the public ¯rm's objective is to
maximize consumer surplus and its pro¯t. In Ohori (2006b), the consumption externality is considered
although the objective of the public ¯rm is as in this paper. However, as the public ¯rm does not
incorporate environmental damage and tax revenue into its objective in Wang and Wang (2009), and as
Ohori (2006b)'s model is the same as ours, we model our work on both Wang and Wang (2009) and Ohori
(2006b).
3
above results.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our model. Sections 3
and 4 derive the equilibrium outcomes under both emission tax and emission quota in the
case where the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer and in the case where the public ¯rm
is a CSPS maximizer, respectively. Section 5 compares the equilibrium outcomes of these
two cases. Section 6 concludes the main text. The appendixes contain the proofs of the
propositions.
2 Model
We follow the model used by B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2006), Naito and Ogawa (2009),
and Kato (2010). Consider an industry with two ¯rms|one public (¯rm 0) and one private
(¯rm 1)|producing a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function of the good is given
by p = ® ¡ Q, where Q = q0 + q1 denotes the total output; qi (i = 0; 1), the output of
¯rm i; p, the price of the good; and ® > 0. Both ¯rms have symmetric production cost
functions given by cpi (qi) = cq
2
i =2.
Pollution ei is generated by production. Producing one unit of output generates one
unit of pollution. Firms can reduce their pollution by reducing their output or by making
abatement e®ort ai. Firm i's emission can be represented as ei = maxfqi ¡ ai; 0g. The
abatement cost function of ¯rm i is cai (ai) = ka
2
i =2.
3 The pro¯t of ¯rm i is given by
¼i(q0; q1; ai) = (®¡ q0 ¡ q1)qi ¡ cq
2
i
2
¡ ka
2
i
2
: (1)
Welfare is the sum of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS), and environmental
damage, and is given by
W (q0; q1; a0; a1) =
Z Q
0
(®¡ s)ds¡
1X
i=0
cq2i
2
¡
1X
i=0
ka2i
2
¡ (e0 + e1)
2
2
; (2)
3We follow the assumption that the cost of production and of abatement e®ort are additively separable.
For the causes underlying the usage of this assumption, see B¶arcena-Ruiz and Garz¶on (2006) and Kato
(2010).
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where the last term represents the environmental damage.
Next, we de¯ne the objective function of each ¯rm. The objective function of the
private ¯rm is its own pro¯t. With respect to the objective function of the public ¯rm (U
or ¹U), we consider the following two cases:
Public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer: U = µW + (1¡ µ)¼0; (3)
Public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer: ¹U = µ(CS + PS) + (1¡ µ)¼0; (4)
where µ 2 [0; 1]. When µ = 0, the public ¯rm is a pure pro¯t maximizer regardless of its
objective, and when µ = 1, the public ¯rm is a pure welfare maximizer in the former case
and a pure CSPS maximizer in the latter case. µ is understood as the share holding of the
public sector, and 1¡ µ, as that of the private sector.4
The decision-making sequence of the government and the ¯rms is as follows. First,
in each case, the government chooses the level of regulation, given the degree of partial
privatization µ. Then, each ¯rm simultaneously chooses its output and abatement e®ort.
To simplify analysis, we assume the parameters of the cost functions c and k are equal
to 1. Of course, the value of these parameters might a®ect the results of the paper.
However, given this value, we can obtain notable results that are quite di®erent from those
in previous studies.
3 Public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer
3.1 Emission tax
Consider a situation in which the government imposes an emission tax. The maximization
problem of each ¯rm is given by
max
q0;a0
U t(q0; q1; a0; a1); (5)
max
q1;a1
¼t1(q0; q1; a1); (6)
4For a rationalization of this objective function, see BÄos (1991).
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where we denote U t = µW + (1 ¡ µ)¼t0 and ¼ti as ¼i(qi; qj; ai) ¡ tei (j 6= i = 0; 1), where t
denotes emission tax.
The ¯rst-order conditions of the above maximization problem are as follows:
@U t
@q0
= ®¡ 3q0 ¡ (1 + µ)q1 + µ(a0 + a1)¡ (1¡ µ)t = 0; (7)
@U t
@a0
= ¡(1 + µ)a0 ¡ µa1 + µ(q0 + q1) + (1¡ µ)t = 0; (8)
@¼t1
@q1
= ®¡ q0 ¡ 3q1 ¡ t = 0; (9)
@¼t1
@a1
= ¡a1 + t = 0: (10)
When µ = 1, the public ¯rm is a pure welfare maximizer, and consequently, the term
related to emission tax does not appear in (7) and (8). We note that given the model
and the assumption, the concavity of the objective function of each ¯rm in all cases is
satis¯ed. Therefore, the second-order conditions of the maximization problem of each ¯rm
are satis¯ed in all cases. This, however, is not shown in this paper.
Given the above behavior of each ¯rm, the government maximizes welfare with regard
to t. We can obtain the following equilibrium outcomes:
qT0 =
3®(40¡ 56µ + 59µ2 ¡ 13µ3)
¢T
; qT1 =
3®(40¡ 72µ + 81µ2 ¡ 38µ3 + 7µ4)
¢T
;
aT0 =
®(72¡ 100µ + 107µ2 ¡ 34µ3 + 9µ4)
¢T
; aT1 =
®(72¡ 124µ + 143µ2 ¡ 61µ3 + 6µ4)
¢T
;
eT0 =
®(48¡ 68µ + 70µ2 ¡ 5µ3 ¡ 9µ4)
¢T
; eT1 =
®(4¡ 4µ + 3µ2)(12¡ 11µ + 5µ2)
¢T
;
tT =
®(72¡ 124µ + 143µ2 ¡ 61µ3 + 6µ4)
¢T
; QT =
3®(80¡ 128µ + 140µ2 ¡ 51µ3 + 7µ4)
¢T
;
AT =
®(144¡ 224µ + 250µ2 ¡ 95µ3 + 15µ4)
¢T
; ET =
2®(4¡ µ)(12¡ 17µ + 17µ2 ¡ 3µ3)
¢T
;
W T =
3®2(96¡ 160µ + 176µ2 ¡ 70µ3 + 9µ4)
2¢T
;
where ¢T = 552¡ 940µ+1049µ2¡ 442µ3+69µ4 > 0. A and E denote the total abatement
e®ort and the total emission, respectively. In the subsequent analysis, the superscripts T
and Q denote the equilibrium outcomes under emission tax and emission quota when the
public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer, respectively.
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3.2 Emission quota
Consider a situation in which the government imposes an emission quota. The maximiza-
tion problems of ¯rm 0 and ¯rm 1 are given by
max
q0;a0
U(q0; q1; a0; a1) s.t. ¹e = e0(q0; a0); (11)
max
q1;a1
¼1(q0; q1; a1) s.t. ¹e = e1(q1; a1): (12)
In our subsequent analysis, we restrict our attention to the case where each emission quota
is binding because we focus on the comparison of the e®ectiveness of emission tax and
emission quota.
We substitute ai = ai(qi; ¹e) = qi¡ ¹e into each objective function, and then de¯ne U q as
U(q0; q1; a0(q0; ¹e); a1) and ¼
q
1 as ¼1(q0; q1; a1(q1; ¹e)).
Calculating the ¯rst-order conditions of the maximization problem of each ¯rm, we ¯nd
that
@U q
@q0
= ®+ ¹e¡ (4¡ µ)q0 ¡ q1 = 0; (13)
@¼q1
@q1
= ®+ ¹e¡ q0 ¡ 4q1 = 0: (14)
Given the behavior of each ¯rm, the government maximizes welfare with regard to ¹e.
The equilibrium outcomes are as follows:
qQ0 =
18®(15¡ 4µ)
¢Q
; qQ1 =
6®(3¡ µ)(15¡ 4µ)
¢Q
;
aQ0 =
®(162¡ 18µ ¡ 5µ2)
¢Q
; aQ1 =
®(162¡ 108µ + 19µ2)
¢Q
;
¹eQ = eQi =
®(108¡ 54µ + 5µ2)
¢Q
;
QQ =
6®(6¡ µ)(15¡ 4µ)
¢Q
; AQ =
2®(162¡ 63µ + 7µ2)
¢Q
;
EQ =
2®(108¡ 54µ + 5µ2)
¢Q
;
WQ =
3®2(108¡ 54µ + 5µ2)
¢Q
;
where ¢Q = 1242¡ 666µ + 91µ2 > 0.
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4 Public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer
4.1 Emission tax
Consider a situation in which the government imposes an emission tax. The maximization
problem of each ¯rm is given by
max
q0;a0
¹U t(q0; a0; q1; a1); (15)
max
q1;a1
¼t1(q0; q1; a1): (16)
Here, we denote ¹U t as µ(CS + PS) + (1¡ µ)¼t0 where PS =
P
¼ti .
The ¯rst-order conditions of the above maximization problem are as follows:
@ ¹U t
@q0
= ®¡ (3¡ µ)q0 ¡ q1 ¡ t; (17)
@ ¹U t
@a0
= ¡a0 + t = 0; (18)
@¼t1
@q1
= ®¡ q0 ¡ 3q1 ¡ t = 0; (19)
@¼t1
@a1
= ¡a1 + t = 0: (20)
We note that even when µ = 1, the term related to the emission tax appears in (17) and
(18), which is di®erent from when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer (see (7) and (8)).
The government chooses t to maximize welfare, given the ¯rms' behavior. We obtain
the following equilibrium outcomes:
qT
0
0 =
6®(20¡ 7µ)
¢T 0
; qT
0
1 =
3®(20¡ 7µ)(2¡ µ)
¢T 0
;
aT
0
i =
2®(36¡ 20µ + 3µ2)
¢T 0
;
eT
0
0 =
2®(3 + µ)(8¡ 3µ)
¢T 0
; eT
0
1 =
®(48¡ 62µ + 15µ2)
¢T 0
;
tT
0
=
2®(36¡ 20µ + 3µ2)
¢T 0
; QT
0
=
3®(20¡ 7µ)(4¡ µ)
¢T 0
;
AT
0
=
4®(36¡ 20µ + 3µ2)
¢T 0
; ET
0
=
®(96¡ 64µ + 9µ2)
¢T 0
;
W T
0
=
3®2(96¡ 64µ + 9µ2)
2¢T 0
;
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where ¢T
0
= 552¡ 388µ + 69µ2 > 0.
In the subsequent analysis, we use superscripts T 0 and Q0 to denote the equilibrium
outcomes under emission tax and emission quota when the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer,
respectively.
4.2 Emission quota
Consider a situation in which the government imposes an emission quota. The maximiza-
tion problem of each ¯rm is given by
max
q0;a0
¹U(q0; q1; a0; a1) s.t. ¹e = e0(q0; a0); (21)
max
q1;a1
¼1(q0; q1; a1) s.t. ¹e = e1(q0; a0): (22)
We substitute ai = ai(qi; ¹e) = qi¡ ¹e into each objective function, and then de¯ne ¹U q as
¹U(q0; q1; a0(q0; ¹e); a1).
Calculating the ¯rst-order conditions for the maximization problem of each ¯rm, we
get
@ ¹U q
@q0
= ®+ ¹e¡ (4¡ µ)q0 ¡ q1 = 0; (23)
@¼q1
@q1
= ®+ ¹e¡ q0 ¡ 4q1 = 0: (24)
The government chooses ¹e to maximize W , given the ¯rms' behavior. Calculating the
equilibrium outcomes, we ¯nd that the equilibrium outcomes are the same as that under
emission quota when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer, that is, (23) and (24) are the
same as (13) and (14), respectively. This is because emission quota is binding on all ¯rms:
the emission of each ¯rm is constant. In this case, whether or not environmental damage
and tax revenue are included in the public ¯rm's objective does not a®ect the ¯rst-order
conditions of the maximization problem of the public ¯rm under emission quota. Therefore,
the decision of the public ¯rm is the same regardless of its objective. The equivalence
between Q and Q0 holds.
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To summarize, we ¯nd that the behavior of the public ¯rm di®ers with objective under
emission tax, but stays the same under emission quota.
5 Comparison between emission quota and emission
tax
Using the results of the aforementioned sections, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
under two environmental policies. First, we obtain the following relationships for the
equilibrium outcomes in each case.
Proposition 1. When the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer,
qT1 · qQ1 · qQ0 · qT0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
aQ1 · aT1 · aT0 · aQ0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
eT1 · eQ1 = eQ0 · eT0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
QT · QQ if and only if µ 2 £0; µQ¤ ;
AQ · AT if and only if µ 2 £0; µA¤ ;
ET · EQ if and only if µ 2 £0; µE¤ ;
where µQ :=: 0:22, µA
:=: 0:69, µE
:=: 0:57, and the strong inequality holds if µ 6= 0.
When the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer,
qT
0
1 · qQ
0
1 · qQ
0
0 · qT
0
0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
aQ
0
1 · aT
0
1 = a
T 0
0 · aQ
0
0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
eT
0
1 · eQ
0
1 = e
Q0
0 · eT
0
0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
QQ
0 · QT 0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
AQ
0 · AT 0 ; for all µ 2 [0; 1];
EQ
0 · ET 0 if and only if µ 2 £0; ¹µ¤ ;
where ¹µ = (81¡p3551)=43 :=: 0:50 and the strong inequality holds if µ 6= 0.
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Proof. A simple comparison of the equilibrium outcomes yields the results in Proposition
1. For the proofs of some comparisons, see Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. First, we deal with the comparison of
the equilibrium outcomes of each ¯rm under the two objectives on qi, ai, and ei. In both
cases, when µ increases, the public ¯rm has an incentive to produce more than the private
¯rm because the public ¯rm chooses its output considering consumer surplus. However,
an increase in the output of the public ¯rm decreases the output of the private ¯rm and
this results in an increase in the ine±ciency of product allocation. Taking into consider-
ation this negative e®ect, it is desirable for the private ¯rm to produce more. Therefore,
the government chooses the emission quota level to enhance welfare with the e±ciency
of production allocation considered. As a result, the di®erences in the emission and out-
put of both ¯rms are smaller under emission quota than under emission tax. Emission
quota requires more (less) abatement e®ort from the public (private) ¯rm as compared to
emission tax. These results are common under both objectives. We note that the public
¯rm produces more when the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer than when it is a welfare
maximizer because in the latter case, the public ¯rm chooses its output by taking into
consideration not only consumer surplus but also environmental damage.
Next, we compare the equilibrium outcomes of Q, A, and E under the two objectives.
We ¯rst consider the case when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer. Suppose that µ
is small. Simple calculation shows that emission quota (tax) increases (decreases) in µ
as shown in Figure 1. From the results obtained in the previous section, we note that
the public ¯rm|when it is a welfare maximizer|behaves as if it is a CSPS maximizer
under emission quota. Given this fact, we get that the di®erence between the increases
in the public ¯rm's output under the two objectives is small. On the other hand, the
di®erence between the output levels of the private ¯rm under the two objectives is large.
This is because under emission quota, the private ¯rm chooses its output by taking into
consideration not only the production cost but also the abatement cost since it can adjust
its abatement e®ort by choosing its output to satisfy its emission constraint. However,
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under emission tax, the private ¯rm chooses its output by taking into consideration only
its production cost and emission tax payment because it chooses its abatement to be equal
to the emission tax level. As a result, given an increase in the output of the public ¯rm,
the private ¯rm does not decrease its output under emission quota as much as under
emission tax. Therefore, QQ > QT . With regard to the total abatement e®ort, from the
aforementioned results, we get that emission tax requires the abatement of both ¯rms to
be equal to the emission tax level to a large extent, whereas the emission quota is more
relaxed for the private ¯rm and more severe for the public ¯rm. Given this asymmetric
e®ect for the abatement cost, AT > AQ, and hence, EQ > ET .
We suppose that µ is large. In this case, the e®ects of emission tax on both ¯rms are
asymmetric: emission tax does not directly a®ect the behavior of the public ¯rm whereas
the emission quota level is the same for both ¯rms. The public ¯rm can expand its output
more under emission tax. Therefore, QT > QQ. With respect to the total abatement
e®ort, the public ¯rm voluntary makes the abatement e®ort under emission tax, whereas
it makes a much larger abatement e®ort under emission quota to meet the severe emission
constraint (see Figure 1). This yields that AQ > AT , and hence, ET > EQ.
Finally, we consider the case when the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer. Under emission
tax, the public ¯rm has a strong incentive to produce more when the public ¯rm is a CSPS
maximizer than when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer because the public ¯rm does
not consider environmental damage when it is a CSPS maximizer. This strong incentive to
expand output yields QT > QQ. Di®erent from the case when the public ¯rm is a welfare
maximizer, emission tax requires the abatement e®ort of each ¯rm to be perfectly equal to
the emission tax level. Under emission tax, simple calculation yields that the emission tax
level monotonically increases in µ. Therefore, AT > AQ. With regard to the total emission,
whether or not the emission under emission tax is larger than that under emission quota
is not determined uniquely. When µ is small, it is desirable from the welfare viewpoint to
increase consumer surplus at the expense of an increase in environmental damage. However,
when µ is large, under emission tax, an increase in the total output results in a considerable
increase in the ine±ciency of production allocation and environmental damage. To reduce
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these negative e®ects, the emission tax level is kept su±ciently high. Therefore, EQ > ET
when µ is large.
Finally, we compare welfare under emission tax with that under emission quota. Then,
we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
When the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer, WQ · W T for all µ 2 [0; 1]:
When the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer, WQ
0 · W T 0 if and only if µ 2 £0; ¹µ¤ :
Here, ¹µ = (81¡p3551)=43 :=: 0:50.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figures 2 and 3 show welfare comparison when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer
and a CSPS maximizer, respectively. In Figure 3, we denote µ^ :=: 0:82.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. First, we consider welfare comparison
when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer. Note that under emission quota, the public
¯rm chooses its output and abatement e®ort as if the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer.
In this case, the public ¯rm is no longer a pure welfare maximizer even if µ = 1, and
therefore, the behavior of the public ¯rm might result in a larger distortion in welfare than
that under emission tax. In particular, when µ is small, an increase in emission quota
yields a large enough increase in environmental damage, and then, W T > WQ. When µ
is large, environmental damage and the ine±ciency of the production allocation are larger
under emission tax than under emission quota. However, consumer surplus is also larger
under emission tax. The latter positive e®ect dominates the former negative e®ects because
the government can control the behavior of the private ¯rm to a large extent by choosing
the emission tax level: the public ¯rm is closer to being a welfare maximizer, and then,
emission tax can be regarded as a way to control the private ¯rm.5 Therefore, regardless
of µ, emission tax is welfare superior to emission quota when the public ¯rm is a welfare
maximizer.
5In this paper, we assume that c = k = 1. If we consider alternative values, the results may change.
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Next, we consider the case when the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer. A simple
calculation shows that emission tax increases in µ 2 [0; 1] whereas emission quota increases
(decreases) in µ 2 [0; 9=11] (µ 2 [9=11; 1]). When µ is small, the positive e®ects of an
increase in consumer surplus and tax revenue dominate the negative e®ects of an increase
in environmental damage and the ine±ciency of production allocation. However, when µ
is large, the strong incentive for the public ¯rm to produce more results in the negative
e®ect being quite large, and then, the negative e®ect dominates the positive e®ect. As a
result, emission tax is welfare superior (inferior) to emission quota when µ is small (large)
and the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer.
With regard to the public ¯rm being a CSPS maximizer, we ¯nally refer to the result
in Kato (2010), which does not consider the partial privatization of the public ¯rm, that
is, considers only µ 2 f0; 1g. Kato (2010) shows that WQ0 > W T 0 > W P in the same
setting as in this paper, where the superscript P denotes the equilibrium under emission
tax/quota after full privatization (µ = 0). From the results in this paper, if we consider
the partial privatization of the public ¯rm, we ¯nd that the degree of partial privatization
a®ects the welfare ranking of the environmental policies, and that this e®ect is dependent
on the public ¯rm's objective.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper compares emission tax with emission quota in a mixed duopoly when the partial
privatization of a public ¯rm can be allowed. Furthermore, we consider the following two
cases with regard to the objective of the public ¯rm: (1) the public ¯rm maximizes the
weighted average of its pro¯t and welfare and (2) the public ¯rm maximizes the weighted
average of its pro¯t and CSPS. We show that emission tax is welfare superior to emission
quota regardless of the degree of partial privatization in the former case, whereas emission
tax is welfare inferior to emission quota when the degree of partial privatization is high in
the latter case.
We discuss the possible implication of our results. If the public sector, which owns
14
a public ¯rm, emphasizes both the environmental problem and economic development
(for example, as in the developed countries), the government should impose emission tax.
However, if the public sector shows a marked disdain for the environmental problem (for
example, as in the developing countries) and the public ¯rm is slated for gradual privati-
zation, the government should ¯rst impose emission quota, and then, impose emission tax
after privatization is well under way. When choosing environmental policies, we have to
pay attention to the situation of the public ¯rm and the degree of privatization.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we compare QQ and QT . We obtain
QQ ¡QT = 3Á(µ)µ
2®
¢Q¢T
; (25)
where Á(µ) = 148¡ 672µ ¡ 112µ2 + 385µ3 ¡ 85µ4. We examine whether Á(µ) is positive.
Á0(µ) = ¡672¡ 224µ + 1155µ2 ¡ 340µ3
= ¡14µ(4¡ 5µ)2 ¡ 595(1¡ µ2)¡ 77 + 10µ3 < 0 for all µ 2 [0; 1]:
From the results, we ¯nd that Á(µ) is monotonically decreasing in µ 2 [0; 1]. As Á(0) =
148 > 0 and Á(1) = ¡336 < 0, there exits some µQ for which QQ ¡ QT = 0. After
calculations, we have µQ :=: 0:22.
Second, we compare AQ and AT . We obtain
AQ ¡ AT = 3½(µ)µ
2®
¢Q¢T
; (26)
where ½(µ) = ¡2248 + 5444µ ¡ 3972µ2 + 1252µ3 ¡ 133µ4. We examine whether ½(µ) is
positive.
½0(µ) = 5444¡ 7944µ + 3753µ2 ¡ 532µ3
= 3753(1¡ µ)2 + 438(1¡ µ) + 532(1¡ µ3) + 721 > 0 for all µ 2 [0; 1]:
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From the results, we ¯nd that ½(µ) is monotonically increasing in µ 2 [0; 1]. As ½(0) =
¡2248 < 0 and ½(1) = 342 > 0, there exits some µA for which AQ ¡ AT = 0. After
calculations, we have µA :=: 0:69.
Third, we compare EQ and ET . We obtain
EQ ¡ ET = 6Â(µ)µ
2®
¢Q¢T
; (27)
where Â(µ) = 1198¡ 3058µ+1930µ2¡ 433µ3+24µ4. We examine whether Â(µ) is positive.
Â0(µ) = ¡3058 + 3860µ ¡ 1299µ2 + 96µ3
= ¡1299(1¡ µ)2 ¡ 1262(1¡ µ)¡ 96(1¡ µ3)¡ 401 < 0 for all µ 2 [0; 1]:
From the results, we ¯nd that Â(µ) is monotonically decreasing in µ 2 [0; 1]. As Â(0) =
1198 > 0 and Â(1) = ¡339 < 0, there exits some µE for which EQ ¡ ET = 0. After
calculations, we have µE :=: 0:57.
Finally, we compare EQ
0
and ET
0
. We obtain
EQ
0 ¡ ET 0 = ¡3º(µ)µ
2®
¢Q¢T 0
;
where º(µ) = 70 ¡ 162µ + 43µ2. We denote ¹µ 2 [0; 1] as the solution of º(¹µ) = 0. After
calculations, we have ¹µ = (81¡p3551)=43 :=: 0:50.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we compare welfare under emission quota and emission tax
when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer. We obtain
WQ ¡W T = ¡9[(1¡ µ)
2f10(1¡ 2µ)2 + 62g+ 36µ2(1¡ µ) + 16¡ 8µ3 + 3µ4]µ2®
¢Q¢T
< 0:
Next, we compare welfare under emission quota and emission tax when the public ¯rm
is a CSPS maximizer. We obtain
WQ
0 ¡W T 0 = ¡9º(µ)µ
2®2
2¢Q¢T 0
:
The above relationship depends on the sign of º(µ). By quantifying the condition, we
obtain Proposition 2.
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Figure 1: Relationships between tT and ¹eQ when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer
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Figure 2: Welfare comparison when the public ¯rm is a welfare maximizer
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Figure 3: Welfare comparison when the public ¯rm is a CSPS maximizer
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